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Justification, Critique and Deliberative Legitimacy:
The Limits of Mini-Publics

Introduction
As deliberative democracy is hailed as the most successful innovation by democratic theory so far (Pateman, 2012), such enthusiasm demands critical engagement with the theory’s past and future. Deliberative democracy became the widely applicable, practical innovation it is now celebrated for only with the invention of so-called ‘mini-publics.’ Deliberative mini-publics—small-scale discussion events on specific political issues among representative samples of ordinary citizens—function as “recipes” for specific desired outcomes associated with deliberation (Fung, 2003). Whether the aim is to inform citizens, to resolve impasses between factions, or to facilitate citizen input into policy-making, mini-publics are designed to artificially create public spheres specific to that purpose that are “more perfect” than could otherwise be found in reality (Fung, 2003, p. 338). However, with the empirical and institutional turns in deliberative democracy, which increasingly shifted scholarly attention away from abstract normative ideals and towards these types of real-world applications of the theory, also came a general turning-away from many of the core norms of early deliberative democratic theory (Pateman, 2012, p. 10), including critical scrutiny of authority as the basis for legitimacy. Institutional recipe-like experiments in the name of deliberative democracy, such as mini-publics, are unable to satisfy the legitimacy demands implicit in deliberative democratic theory. Although there are examples of highly critical mini-publics, it is not the institutional design that makes them critical. In fact, those features of deliberation that are crucial from a legitimacy perspective—critical attitudes towards authority—are beyond the reach of institutional design.
Thus, this paper argues, while institutional designs such as mini-publics may be instrumental to the realization of some dimensions of deliberative democracy, the realization of the legitimacy norm demands a different approach. Critical attitudes cannot be artificially engineered, but are an emergent property of the norms, expectations, and ethos that together make up the political culture of a society. Hence, from this perspective, deliberative democracy manifests itself in a certain political culture more than in a specific set of formal institutions. Those seeking to realize deliberative democracy in practice should aim to open up socio-political space for a deliberative democratic culture to self-evolve, rather than seeking the purposive instantiation of deliberative democracy.
The argument proceeds as follows. The first section outlines the concept of mini-publics as practical realizations of deliberation, while the second describes the deliberative democratic account of legitimacy. The third section draws the two concepts together to show where mini-publics are limited when it comes to legitimacy: The supposedly ideal conditions that mini-publics create in fact sideline the critical dimension of deliberation that is crucial for its legitimating function; and even where they do not, it is the very approach of ‘designing’ ideal conditions that contradicts the role of deliberation suggested by the legitimacy norm. Thus, the fourth section highlights the importance of realizing deliberative democracy through cultural change, from which follows, in the fifth section, an account of deliberative democracy conceived of as a political culture. The final section concludes.
Mini-publics, and their limits
Since the empirical and institutional turns in deliberative democratic theory, the main form of deliberation in real-world practice have been the so-called ‘mini-publics’ in the form of deliberative polls, consensus conferences, citizens’ juries, planning cells, and citizen assemblies (Fung, 2003; Goodin and Dryzek, 2006; Elstub, 2014; Grönlund et al., 2014). Mini-publics are deliberative events that are designed purposively to set up deliberation on a certain policy or issue among a representative group of ordinary citizens. They typically invite a stratified random sample of citizens to attend the event at a hotel or conference venue, with a timeframe of between a few days and a few weeks. The typical order of events comprises the distribution of information on the issue at hand; setting the rules of fair, respectful debate; several rounds of deliberation, with opportunities to consult neutral experts in between; and finally the formulation of some form of concluding statement (Goodin and Dryzek, 2006).
Through these features, mini-publics are supposed to create the ideal conditions for deliberation, which are not otherwise found in the real world (Fung, 2011, p. 183; 2003, pp. 338-9; Chambers, 2009, p. 330; Dryzek and Tucker, 2008, p. 865). For instance, it would otherwise be unlikely that a sufficiently heterogeneous but also representative group of citizens would come together to discuss a certain issue; and even if they did, it could not be guaranteed that their exchange would be as fair, respectful, and equal as the deliberative democratic norm demands (Ryfe, 2005, p. 52). Only a limited number of people can meaningfully deliberate together (Parkinson, 2006, pp. 4-5; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p. 131), and deliberation breaks down if the balance of views is not suitable (Goodin, 2008, pp. 238-9). Citizens may not possess sufficient information to adequately form their viewpoints (Fishkin et al., 2000, p. 657) or may not be willing to engage in deliberation (Ryfe, 2005, p. 51). Lastly, even if deliberation were to occur spontaneously and bottom-up, there would be no obvious channel for its outcomes to inform formal politics (Goodin, 2012, p. 807). Mini-publics remedy these problems by inviting a representative sample of an adequate size, providing balanced information materials and the opportunity to question experts, making use of a mediator to facilitate respectful interaction, and (in some cases) linking the deliberative event to formal policy-making processes.
Thus, mini-publics are designed to enable a certain desired outcome to be achieved through a matching deliberative process; like “recipes” specifically geared towards the desired effect (Fung, 2003). A multitude of political goals can be furthered in this way, such as educating citizens to have more considered opinions; facilitating citizen input through participatory policy-making; or advancing problem solution and mediation (Fung, 2003, pp. 340-2; Button and Mattson, 1999, pp. 612-3). The wide consensus is that it is “well-designed” mini-publics that can achieve these purposes and overcome common problems of inequality and other distortions (e.g. Karpowitz et al., 2009, pp. 580, 583; MacKenzie and Warren, 2014, p. 111; Warren, 2009, p. 10). Thus, a large part of the theoretical literature on mini-publics has dealt with specific design choices, such as the group composition, the type of facilitation, or the decision on the issue to deliberate on (e.g. Fishkin, 1999; Fishkin et al., 2000; Fung and Wright, 2001; Fung, 2003; Karpowitz et al., 2009), in light of these different purposes.
Studies on the design and functions of mini-publics along these lines have been very successful in empirically proving such events’ positive impacts in numerous respects (e.g. Smith and Wales, 2000; Fishkin et al., 2000; Smith, 2009; Grönlund et al., 2010; Niemeyer, 2011). As a result, mini-publics have come to be celebrated as “among the most promising actual constructive efforts for civic engagement and public deliberation in contemporary politics” (Fung, 2003, p. 339). Although it is true that the study of mini-publics does not necessarily imply that these theorists regard mini-publics as a realization of deliberative democracy (Dryzek, 2010, pp. 6-7), and not all theorists would agree with Fung’s (2003, p. 339) claim that “the proliferation of better minipublics” may be a superior route towards deliberative democracy “than improving the one big public” (e.g. Parkinson, 2006, p. 167; Lafont, 2015), by now, mini-publics have still “become one of the main mechanisms advocated for, and employed to, institutionalise deliberative democracy” (Elstub and McLaverty, 2014, p. 14).
Despite mini-publics’ many proven functions, there are limits to what can be engineered through design choices, however. Insofar as deliberative democracy presupposes, for instance, initiative on the part of citizens, certain genuinely held attitudes, or any larger-scale, society-wide changes, there will be dimensions of deliberative democracy that are not directly realized through purposive design. The success and useful contributions of mini-publics notwithstanding, therefore, the realization of deliberative democracy now requires these studies to be supplemented with an alternative perspective, shedding light on those dimensions of deliberative democracy that cannot be achieved through institutional design. One of these, I argue, is the norm of democratic legitimacy inherent in early deliberative theory, which has so far not been adequately captured by mini-public design. If I am right, this means that for deliberative democracy to realize its promise of democratic legitimacy, it is imperative to develop alternative forms of deliberation in practice, and, in the spirit of the recent focus on complex, multi-dimensional ‘deliberative systems’ (Parkinson and Mansbridge, 2012), implement these alongside mini-publics.
Indeed, although studies of deliberative events are often linked to the wider theory of deliberative democracy, a gap is discernible between the demanding normative commitments of early deliberative democratic theory—notably legitimacy—and the readiness with which more limited practical accounts are nowadays still termed ‘deliberative’ (Steiner, 2008; Parkinson, 2006, p. 4), or, even worse, ‘deliberative democratic’ (Chambers, 2009). Concern about this gap—and the loss of the critical theory tradition in deliberative democracy that comes with it—has long been expressed by theorists such as John Dryzek (2000), Iris Marion Young (2001), Simone Chambers (2009) and Christian Rostbøll (2011). As early as 2000, John Dryzek (2000) lamented the loss of the original critical edge in deliberative democracy as undermining the pursuit of “more authentic democracy” that deliberative democracy stands for as a normative theory (Dryzek, 2000, p. 29). More recently, Chambers, while acknowledging mini-publics’ important functions (Chambers, 2009, p. 330), has argued that the overwhelming enthusiasm for small-scale experiments is “troubling” from a democratic point of view (Chambers, 2009, p. 330). Since deliberation in practice serves many useful purposes above and beyond its contribution to legitimacy, there is a danger that the recent surge of institutional accounts of deliberation, precisely because they are so successful in relation to these other dimensions, is diverting the attention away from its original normative dimension of democratic legitimacy, and towards a more practical ideal of deliberation with less ambitious normative commitments.
Against this background, this paper asks how we might imagine deliberation occurring in practice in a way that establishes deliberative democratic legitimacy. Although mini-publics can go some way towards establishing legitimacy in deliberative democratic terms, there are important elements to it that are not captured by the design ‘recipes’ at the heart of this institutional innovation approach. Thus, the question is not only how mini-publics are best designed when the outcome desideratum is legitimacy. The more important question is what altogether different conception of deliberation in practice might be able to capture those dimensions of deliberative democracy, such as legitimacy, that cannot be engineered through institutional design choices.
Legitimacy
In deliberative democracy, legitimacy originates not in numbers (such as the majority vote) or power (such as dictatorial or elite rule), but from the “unforced force of the better argument” (Habermas, 1996, p. 541). This norm implies that the legitimacy of authority (regardless of any other formal procedures that the deliberative dimension might complement, such as elections) must be based on argumentative justification through public reasoning to those subject to it (Cohen, 1996, pp. 99-100; Lafont, 2006, pp. 7-8; Chambers, 2010, p. 893).
Some deliberative democratic literature on legitimacy has considered the legitimacy of deliberative events themselves (e.g. Parkinson, 2003; 2006). For instance, some theorists have measured legitimacy in this sense in terms of the reception of the deliberative event both by those taking part and by those not taking part (e.g. Hendriks et al., 2007; Karpowitz et al., 2009). This constitutes not a deliberative democratic norm of legitimacy, but rather the legitimacy of deliberative democracy (conceived of as single deliberative events) in conventional terms: the higher the numbers of affected citizens consenting, the more legitimate the event. Another strand of the literature concerns the justification of deliberative procedures in the abstract. If deliberation can be shown to be more conducive to legitimacy than other models of democracy, so the line of thought, then it is a superior theory of democracy (see, e.g., the literature on epistemic justifications of deliberative democracy, e.g. Estlund, 1997; Chappell, 2011). Again, this approach does not consider the legitimacy norm established by deliberative democratic theory itself, but rather evaluates deliberative democracy—this time at the level of the abstract norms rather than real-world events—from the perspective of externally arrived at definitions of legitimacy.
My perspective in this article is different. I consider how deliberative democracy itself theorizes the legitimacy of a polity, or of political authority generally; i.e. what normative demands of legitimacy are implicit in the theory of deliberative democracy and how these might be brought to bear on the overall political reality. Hence, the focus is not on the legitimacy (or justification) of deliberation, but rather on the legitimacy created through deliberation, based on the legitimacy norm established by deliberative democratic theory.
In this context, the deliberative norm of legitimacy originates in the fundamental moral equality of all humans (Manin, 1987). Since there is no natural hierarchy between individuals, and everyone is equally free (Manin, 1987, p. 340), the presumption is that any authority that is claimed or exercised by some over others—such as state authority—is prima facie unjustified and in need of justification. According to deliberative democratic norms, it would be insufficient to justify such hierarchy in a generic sense by reference to its instrumental necessity or supposedly obvious truth (Dryzek, 1990, p. 37; Manin, 1987, pp. 353-4); rather, justification must actually be given to those subject to hierarchy through their participation in public deliberation (Dryzek, 2001, p. 651; Parkinson, 2003, p. 181; Rostbøll, 2009, p. 22). Along these lines, Seyla Benhabib argues that “legitimacy in complex democratic societies must be thought to result from the free and unconstrained public deliberation of all about matters of common concern” (Benhabib, 1996, p. 68). As such, deliberative legitimacy of political acts can be defined as “the extent [to which] they receive reflective assent through participation in authentic deliberation by all those subject to the decision in question” (Drzyek, 2010, p. 23). Based on this definition, a polity as a whole is not either legitimate or illegitimate, but authoritative acts can be more or less legitimate depending on the degree to which they originate in processes that approach the ideal of authentic deliberative justification within the broader public sphere.
The norm that justification is required for legitimacy even—in fact, especially—for government decision-making means that authority as such remains illegitimate in principle, even in just and democratic states. Legitimacy in this sense consists not in the onset of an obligation to obey the orders of the (legitimate) authority, but rather in a “moral basis of political authority” (Birch, 2001, p. 58) whose normative force sets limits to the exercise of authority on an ongoing basis. Public justification creates legitimacy by opening up space for accountability and “the rational grounds [for citizens] to criticize power or withhold consent” (Chambers, 2010, p. 896). This space is opened up by deliberative democratic theory because of the demanding standard of justification embodied in Habermas’s formulation of the ‘ideal speech situation’ (Habermas, 1996, pp. 228-30), which can never be realized in practice (Rostbøll, 2009, p. 20; Dryzek, 1990, pp. 36-7): legitimate decision-making as consensus after public deliberation, without any time or space limitation, in a fair and equal setting undistorted by any form of power, strategy, or status. The ideal nature of the ideal speech situation has been criticized as resulting in exclusion and intellectual elitism (e.g. Tucker, 2008, p. 132; also Sanders, 1997; Young, 2000; 2001). Yet, these criticisms misunderstand the purpose of the ideal speech situation. It is not meant as a blueprint (Dryzek, 1990, p. 37), but rather as an imagined ideal that in fact precisely “entails the inclusive and egalitarian dimension” of deliberative democracy (Rostbøll, 2009, p. 21). Rather than allowing for the subversion of the ideal by intellectual or political elites (Tucker, 2008, p. 132), its practical impossibility means that the quest for legitimacy is never ‘settled,’ which makes the legitimacy norm an ongoing normative quest that always remains active, regardless of momentary compromises or expressions of consent (Rostbøll, 2009).
As such, the legitimacy norm implicit in deliberative democracy goes beyond political obligation accounts of legitimacy, for which legitimacy means a duty of obedience to the government authorities (e.g. Simmons, 2001, p. 130; King, 2013, p. 158). Whereas these accounts of legitimacy specifically search for a ground of political obligation which then grants a generic license for the use of authority in the long term (see also Habermas, 1996, pp. 299-300), the deliberative ideal subjects the exercise of authority to a need to re-create itself on an ongoing basis through processes of discursive challenge and justification.
Thus, even though political authority is a necessity for the functioning of the society, legitimacy requires that authority is still treated as fundamentally unjustified, and therefore constantly unmasked and challenged. In practice, justification can then never be regarded as final (Parkinson, 2003, p. 184; Rostbøll, 2009, p. 21). Because a justification that would meet the deliberative democratic ideal could never be given in practice, legitimacy is only constituted precisely by the acknowledgement that the justificatory process is always open and ongoing; that additional justification can always be demanded (Rostbøll, 2009). Democratic legitimacy, opening up such room for challenge equally to all citizens, then manifests itself in a fundamental and perpetual right to justification (Forst, 2012, p. 177; similarly Manin, 1987, p. 352; Parkinson, 2003, p. 184) rather than in singular or even only hypothetical instances of justification (Goodin, 2008, p. 39). Grounding legitimacy in the recognition of a general right to justification thus expresses that the momentum of justification, and the quest for legitimacy, originate in a fundamental norm of non-domination (see Lafont, 2015, p. 45), that is, an individual right not to be subjected to arbitrary, or otherwise unjustifiable, power—even that implicit in ‘settling’ or concluding specific legitimation processes by regarding their (inevitably limited) originating procedures as sufficient and thus final. Rather than constructing an account of formal legitimacy as a basis for authority, the right to justification established by the ideal speech situation thus epitomizes, and demands, a fundamental emancipatory dynamic as a requirement of legitimacy (see Susen, 2009, p. 81; Knops, 2006, pp. 595-6).
At the same time, however, the norms of the deliberative ideal provide the basis for judging the force of the claims made as part of such justificatory processes. Whereas scholars of Rawlsian public reason define a substantive framework only within which claims can be acceptable, the deliberative democratic norm is procedural, declaring a claim acceptable if it is justified through the fair, equal, and undistorted deliberative process. According to Forst (2001; 2012), deliberative democracy demands public reasoning to be reciprocally and generally justifiable, such that
“in making a claim or presenting an argument no one may claim a right or resource he denies to others, whereby the formulation of the claim must itself be open to questioning and not determined by one party only. This precludes the possibility of merely projecting one’s own beliefs, interests and reasons onto others,”
and that
“those subject to the norms in question must have equal chances to advance their claims and arguments” (Forst, 2001, p. 362).
Thus, individuals have a right to justification both towards authorities and towards fellow citizens who make public claims on issues that affect others. A right to public justification opens up space for critique of authority, but it also constrains individuals themselves, who must (in terms of the ideal deliberative standard) justify their own claims towards those who disagree, and accept that only those claims that can be justified reciprocally and generally are valid in the public realm (Forst, 2001, p. 366).
In this way, specific instances of deliberation create some legitimacy, at least for those involved. Yet from the perspective of the general legitimacy of the polity as a whole—which is my perspective in this article—, deliberative democracy requires not only specific instances of deliberation on specific issues. The more significant effect is for public deliberation to establish an overall culture of “ongoing critical scrutiny,” as Smith and Wales (2000, p. 52) call it: an expectation of public justification by authorities, as an expression of the fundamental and perpetual constraints on all authority resulting from emancipatory demands for justification.
The role of critique: Deliberative democracy as a critical theory
As a normative project, committed to challenging the domination inherent in unjustified hierarchy as a matter of legitimacy, deliberative democracy must thus be understood as a critical theory (Young, 2001, pp. 687-8). In opposition to ‘traditional theory’ (Horkheimer, 1972), critical theory is not first and foremost orientated towards generating new forms of understanding in general, but specifically “committed to bringing about […] social conditions free from fear and domination” (Kompridis, 2006, p. 20). The key to overcoming domination is to create the (mere) conditions for (people’s self-)emancipation—for instance, in the case of deliberative democracy, by normatively and practically establishing a general right to justification—which means for a subject to be able to break from any heteronomously predetermined role (Chambers, 2013, pp. 147-8).
Yet domination, in this sense, forms in societies not just with the creation of formal state authority, but also in a more diffuse and creeping manner as hegemonic discourses that “rigidify” how the world is perceived (Kompridis, 2006, p. 35; see also Rostbøll, 2008, p. 720; Young, 2001, pp. 685-8)—which can even infiltrate the project of political theory, including critical theory, itself (see Horkheimer, 1972, p. 212; Chambers, 2013, p. 149). Therefore, emancipation (as what overcomes it) likewise consists not only in specific instances of challenging some blatant forms of direct domination, but also, more importantly, in the existence of a general “reflective discourse” able to constantly “disturb the unreflective, taken-for-granted flow of our self-understanding and social practices” (Kompridis, 2006, p. 35, emphasis added) and to contest not just specific acts but even the very configuration of society at large (see Chambers, 2014, p. 171). In structural terms, emancipation thus presupposes a form of politics understood as “not a matter of ruling but a matter of interrupting rule” (Chambers, 2013, p. 135, emphasis added); in individual terms, it demands a “set of reflective, critical, and innovative capacities” enabling individuals to question, challenge, and transform social practices (Kompridis, 2006, p. 30)—including, self-reflectively, even their own belief systems (Rostbøll, 2008, p. 725).
This highlights that, for deliberative democracy to live up to its self-understanding as a critical theory, its accounts of deliberative legitimation in the real world must presuppose critique as the (only) practice allowing subjects to disrupt domination in its fullest sense, by contributing to a form of “ongoing critical scrutiny” autonomous and reflective enough to resist and unmask the hegemony inherent in both specific authoritative acts and more general discursive structures. Such “critical capacities,” in other words, are key to actually realizing the emancipation demanded by the deliberative norm of legitimacy.
An individual’s being “critical” in this sense does not so much imply their seeking to undermine or abolish a political process, claim, or act in question, as rather to render it contestable in the first place by problematizing it as an object of potential challenge. Short of this, critical theory recognizes, deliberation would remain under the influence of the domination inherent in discursive structures themselves, and thus fail to challenge authority where it is the most pervasive. This implies, in turn, that deliberative governance innovations must be judged against their facilitation not just of any citizen input, but specifically citizens’ capacity to be critical of the authority they are subjected to, in the sense of knowing themselves in the position to have the right and the autonomous reflective capacity to question established discourses and demand justification for authoritative acts in a democratic and deliberatively authentic manner (see Chambers, 2013, p. 124).​[1]​
Two types of deliberation in practice
Mini-publics can contribute to the expectation and reality of critical demands for justification. Presumably, they constitute the type of space in which citizens can demand reasons for proposals that would otherwise be enforced authoritatively without such checks by citizens. Inasmuch as deliberation in practice can live up to its critical role, the more areas of political decision-making are opened up to citizen deliberation, and the more there is an expectation that this is required for legitimate governance, the harder it will be for anyone in the society to dominate others through the unchecked use of power.
However, while mini-publics open up the possibility of critique, they are not necessarily critical against authority in nature or effect. In fact, due to their typical features, mini-publics have both an authority-critical and an authority-supporting—in the sense of being eroding of emancipatory critique—tendency. Their critical tendency consists in opening up room for critical demands for justification, embodying the norm that authority must remain open to challenge. Yet mini-publics are also “extremely useful to policy-makers” (Delap, 2001, p. 39), exhibiting a potentially anti-emancipatory tendency that consists in the ways in which they can be used as an instrument to enhance government authorities’ control over political processes and discourses, thus in fact undermining rather than facilitating citizens’ position to be critical. Whilst a mini-public can constructively support policy-making or approve of authorities’ proposals and still be critical (inasmuch, namely, as this eventual approval still originated in citizens’ position to critique, i.e. to autonomously problematize and object if necessary), mini-publics’ usefulness for authorities becomes problematic if the latter can use them as an effective strategy to foster their control over citizens’ roles and actions in what is then in itself an instance of authoritative domination (see Susen, 2009, p. 86).
For instance, it is telling that a large part of the literature on mini-publics in fact presents deliberation as a way to make demands on citizens, rather than to allow citizens to make demands on governments: Deliberation arguably serves as “public education” (Fishkin et al., 2000, p. 665) that makes citizens competent in the first place, to make “better” or “more ideal” citizens (Normann Andersen and Hansen, 2007; Luskin et al., 2002, p. 460). In a similar vein, deliberative encounters with citizens can be useful for policy-makers to obtain information they need in a direct and focused way (Fung, 2011, p. 190; Brown, 2006, p. 214). Citizen participation of this type is normally associated with enhanced support for, and compliance with, policy outcomes (Fung, 2011, pp. 192-3), which makes governance easier for policymakers; as does the effect of “desensitizing” contentious issues (Goodin, 2008, p. 89). Moreover, deliberation can even be a tool for policymakers to ‘market-test’ their options, to see which can, in what way, best be “sold” to the citizens (Goodin and Dryzek, 2006, p. 229). Thus, deliberation in practice is not necessarily an emancipatory process of interrupting authoritative rule, but can also be motivated by the opposite perception on the part of the authorities that it is useful for policy-making on their own terms and in their own control. Although few mini-publics fall exclusively into either category, it is important to recognize that mini-publics may on balance provide a strategic instrument for governments to foster, more than a channel for citizens to constrain their effective authority.
Indeed, although mini-publics are supposed to create the ideal setting for genuine deliberation (Goodin and Dryzek, 2006, p. 220), the typical features of most existing examples of mini-publics seem to be orientated to the anti-emancipatory, authority-supporting forms of deliberation more than to the critical theory of deliberative democratic legitimacy. For instance, selecting and inviting the participants may ensure a suitable group size and a balance of perspectives. Yet it also means that ordinary citizens cannot take the initiative themselves to create a space for critical scrutiny, but are dependent on government agencies (or, in some cases, sufficiently well-funded NGOs) to provide this opportunity. Deliberation in the form of mini-publics thus does not constitute an instrument available to ordinary citizens to exercise a right to justification. Although those mini-publics that do take place have the potential to effectively exert such pressure, the fact that they are limited to only a narrow range of issues, and specifically those that government authorities have reasons to seek citizen input for, substantially limits the level of effective pressure they exert on authorities. Moreover, the participating citizens have only limited, if any, input into the agenda and the timing and framing of the event; the degree to which the deliberation influences policy is at the discretion of the relevant authorities; and although the information provided and the experts chosen are supposed to be neutral, participants typically have no appreciation of the extent to which this is indeed the case (see Shapiro, 2003, p. 33). To this kind of government-led setting, “protest and opposition are ill-suited” (Warren, 2009, p. 8).
This can force participating citizens into an ominously passive role, vulnerable to the rules and constraints set by the organizers. For example, Aasen and Vatn (2013) report of a citizens’ jury on genetically modified organisms in Denmark, where the participating citizens felt that the agenda constrained what views could be discussed (Aasen and Vatn, 2013, p. 475); the composition of experts—the main determinant of the outcomes of the deliberative event—was biased (Aasen and Vatn, 2013, pp. 475-6); and there was insufficient time for reflection (Aasen and Vatn, 2013, p. 477). Their awareness of these limitations notwithstanding, the citizens were helpless against them, as is evidenced by the fact that some citizens felt after the deliberation that their final document was being misinterpreted (Aasen and Vatn, 2013, p. 478), and even that “[their] voting would have been different” had they had more comprehensive information during the deliberation (Aasen and Vatn, 2013, p. 476). While the distortion may not have been intended in this case, there are examples of mini-publics intentionally used by governments to control—that is, to dominate—the public debate by narrowing it down and managing it in their interest (see e.g. Joly et al., 1999, p. 14; Dryzek et al., 2009, p. 269; Dryzek and Tucker, 2008, p. 870 on a mini-public in France, and Freschi and Mete, 2009, p. 20 on a mini-public in Italy).
In contrast, those conditions that would be ‘ideal’ from a legitimacy perspective are absent from the typical list of mini-public design choices. To contribute to legitimacy as defined above, mini-publics would have to be an emancipatory instrument available to citizens rather than authorities, enabling them to interrupt rather than respond to rule, and to open up new debate in an independent manner through critical demands for justification (see also Benhabib, 1996, p. 70). Thus, the critical type of deliberation would at least demand a stronger role for the deliberators vis-à-vis the organizers and the steering committee (Tucker, 2008, p. 144), if not procedures for citizens to initiate mini-publics and define the agenda.
The limits of institutional design
Still, the impression that mini-publics might encourage authority-supporting deliberation more than critical deliberation does not rule out critical mini-publics. In fact, there are examples of mini-publics which appear, based on their features, to be of the outright anti-emancipatory type, used strategically by government agencies to garner support for their policy line, but whose unexpected critical atmosphere in fact forced the organizing agencies to change their plans (see e.g. Dryzek and Tucker, 2008; Goodin and Dryzek, 2006).
An example is the case of a French consensus conference on genetically modified food, held within the context of a highly closed, centralized and elitist political system typically dismissive of participatory policy-making (Dryzek and Tucker, 2008, pp. 868-9). Although the steering committee was more interventionist and biased than typical of mini-publics elsewhere, and the deliberators’ eventual recommendations were broadly in line with government policy (Dryzek and Tucker, 2008, pp. 868-9), the authors note that “the lay citizens proved more critical and less compliant than expected by the sponsors” (Dryzek and Tucker, 2008, p. 869), and “managerial control was not entirely successful” (Dryzek and Tucker, 2008, p. 870).
Not all mini-publics prove critical like that (and neither are all mini-publics distorting and manipulative). Yet the French example suggests that although the typical features of mini-publics may sideline, if not undermine, critique, they can still exert critical scrutiny and effectively disturb authorities (albeit subject to the respective government’s discretion to act on the deliberators’ report). In fact, even a mini-public whose design features seemed particularly discouraging of critique and particularly encouraging of an uncritically supportive type of deliberation has been effective in putting such pressure on government authorities.
Yet, the point is that the core feature of deliberation from the perspective of legitimacy—critical scrutiny and emancipation—is still not conceivable as part of a menu of outcomes available through the right design choices. Those mini-publics that were critical despite being prone towards supportiveness have been critical not as a result, but rather in spite of their institutional features. In the case of the consensus conference in France, the mini-public was designed in a way that matched the exclusive French governance system, and the design features of the mini-public were intentionally detrimental to critical deliberation; yet the mini-public was highly critical in its atmosphere and effect. Thus, the mini-public was critical in effect not because it was designed to be such, but precisely because the institutional design was ineffective in terms of constraining the degree to which citizens could be critical.
For mini-publics to play a role in creating legitimacy (albeit a limited one given the lack of opportunity for initiative), the decisive element is an atmosphere of genuinely critical attitudes, expressing an effectively embraced right to justification, that thus puts pressure on government authorities to justify their decisions. Yet genuine critique can by its nature not be engineered or forced (Chambers, 2000, p. 203). Participants in a deliberation would not assume a position to critique in any truly emancipatory sense, or contribute to a climate of independently demanding justification, as a result of a facilitator’s instructing them to do so. Rather, as argued above, emancipation requires a “self-empowering” potential within citizens themselves (Susen, 2009, p. 85, emphasis added), and hence has to do with their own expectations and norms that guide how they act in a political setting. In other words, “there is no shortcut to empowerment” (Appadurai, 2004, p. 67); real ‘voice’ in this emancipatory sense cannot be ‘created’ or ‘enabled’ from the outside, but it only comes into existence when those who formally possess it also actively claim it.
Thus, the problem with mini-publics has less to do with their actual empirical effects (which, after all, can go in both directions), but rather lies in their conceptual limitations as institutional design ‘recipes.’ Deliberative democracy of the critical type has a ‘cultural’ component that goes beyond what can be instituted merely through planning and control of the deliberative process. This component includes the prevalence of a certain ethos of democratic engagement; certain attitudes and expectations in the participating individuals; and certain norms guiding their behavior in public; or, in summary, a certain ‘political culture’ within which democratic interaction takes place. This means that deliberative events cannot be regarded as independent of the wider socio-political context they take place in. To achieve authentic deliberation, it is insufficient—if not potentially counterproductive—to invite or incentivize individuals to attend an event and instruct them on what to do (see Hendriks et al., 2007, p. 377). Rather, one precondition of deliberation regards what these individuals themselves bring to the deliberation; their norms and expectations that together will define the ethos of the deliberative exchange with others.
This poses a problem for the very concept of deliberation in mini-publics, which typically grounds its justification in the assertion that it is only through small-scale, carefully designed and controlled events such as mini-publics that the ideal conditions for deliberation can be guaranteed. If one important condition can by its nature not be engineered, mini-publics at most create some of the necessary, but by no means the sufficient conditions for deliberation. Far from extending even “beyond legitimacy” (Fung, 2003, pp. 339-40, emphasis added), mini-publics can be considered contributions to deliberative democratic legitimacy only if they happen to take place in a certain context or climate—not conceptually because of what they are and do.
Given that a critical effect can occur even through unfavorable institutional channels, it seems that the realization of the form of legitimacy demanded by deliberative democracy presupposes first and foremost critical dispositions as the necessary condition, plus some type of institutional channel that brings these to bear on formal political decision-making procedures. At least for this dimension of deliberative democracy, studies seeking to develop the right institutional design are then neither necessary nor helpful. If it is in the first instance what can be summarized as ‘cultural aspects’—the ethos, the norms, and the self-understandings that together shape and constrain political discourse and decision-making—that are decisive in realizing those features of deliberation that are essential for legitimacy, then these ought to be the focus of practical, real-world conceptualizations of deliberative democracy as well. The project of realizing deliberative democracy in practice can thus be conceived of as first and foremost a matter of enabling and giving room for a deliberative democratic political culture, rather than hinging on the development of supposedly ideal deliberative designs.
This point is not merely empirical. As Hendriks et al. (2007, p. 379) argue, “[d]eliberative democratization must itself be a deliberative process, as opposed to the application of some standard set of institutional design.” Presenting democratic change as something dependent on meticulous institutional design would suggest that, even in a democracy, citizens are dependent on being granted a voice, in a carefully controlled manner, rather than having one in the first place. Inasmuch as formal democratic innovations are directed—and sanctioned—by those in positions of authority, they represent, rather than counteract, the stronghold of authority even over the extent to which citizens can voice critique. Regarding deliberative democracy as a project of fine-grained institutional engineering (as opposed to merely creating the general preconditions for an otherwise emancipatory, bottom-up process of democratization) thus contradicts deliberative democracy’s own normative commitments.
This does not mean that mini-publics do not or should not play any role in realizing deliberative democracy. But rather than being conceived of as institutional ‘recipes,’ mini-publics should be regarded as tentative impulses for a broader cultural change. The occurrence of innovations such as mini-publics is itself part of the political culture, and potentially able to contribute to the further evolution of deliberative democratic norms. For example, Chambers (2009) suggests that mini-publics should be understood not as “deliberative assemblies deciding policy,” but rather as opportunities for citizens “to hone the skills necessary to be able to critically evaluate orators” in the wider political system (Chambers, 2009, p. 340). Another function might be to encourage otherwise uninterested or marginalized groups to engage in public debate, an effect highlighted in the evaluation of an Australian mini-public (Hartz-Karp and Carson, 2009, p. 22). What it will come down to, however, is whether such mini-publics indeed prepare the ground for citizens to be critical on their own terms, rather than in fact undermining this in the same instance by teaching participants to fulfill predefined, carefully “orchestrated” (see Escobar, 2015, p. 273) roles. Since mini-publics can be not only uncritical, or, as it were, ‘neutral,’ but also potentially eroding of critique and hence counterproductive, there is at least a danger that even the use of mini-publics as just one component of the instantiation of deliberative democracy could undermine deliberative democracy more than advancing it.
Deliberative democracy as a political culture
An alternative conception to the institutional design approach, then, is to regard the realization of deliberative democracy as a matter of the evolution of particular norms, expectations, and behavioral patterns, that is, of a particular political culture. Such a cultural account means to conceptualize democratization as originating in impulses that innately rest on a more inclusive basis, and as proceeding through self-evolving—less controlled and less controllable—patterns. Political culture in this sense is not a new concern in deliberative democratic theory (Sass and Dryzek, 2014, pp. 6-7). For example, Habermas himself not only regards a general liberal political culture as a precondition for an active citizenry (Scheuerman, 1999, p. 167), for “democratic institutions of freedom disintegrate without the initiatives of a population accustomed to freedom” (Habermas, 1996, p. 130), but, according to Richard Bernstein, even his supposedly procedural democratic theory in fact “presuppos[es] a democratic ethos—an ethos that conditions and affects how discussion, debate, and argumentation are practiced” (Bernstein, 1995, p. 3, original emphasis). As Chambers (2000) highlights, culture thus comes into the picture where the public sphere is to act as a genuinely “democratic watchdog,” as “no laws can force citizens to engage in critical debate; they can merely create the opportunities to do so” (Chambers, 2000, p. 203).
While the significance of political culture for deliberative democracy is generally acknowledged, it is often “afford[ed] … only a residual status” (Sass and Dryzek, 2014, p. 7). In contrast, my argument is that deliberative democracy, inasmuch as its core normative commitments by their nature rest on certain genuine attitudes and self-driven dynamics as opposed to formal-institutional effects, not only presupposes or is influenced by, but consists in a certain cultural ethos; for it is only through such a cultural instantiation that it can be conceptualized as self-evolving in the required emancipatory, bottom-up ways. This is what is meant by ‘deliberative democracy as a political culture:’ Even if deliberative democracy in practice requires both institutions (say, to guarantee basic rights and liberties) and certain cultural dynamics, it is the cultural realm in which deliberative democracy decisively manifests itself, for it is the cultural dynamics that constitute its necessary essence. For the purposes of this argument, I refer to ‘culture’ in juxtaposition to both formal-institutional and purposively steered influences and constraints on people’s attitudes and behavior. Thus, culture in this context denotes the sum of all of the informal and unsteered norms, expectations, meanings, and customs that drive people’s attitudes and behavior. Culture, so defined, “meets deliberation where [it] shape[s] the way political actors engage one another in discourse” (Sass and Dryzek, 2014, p. 21)—yet in diffuse, organic, and bottom-up ways rather than as a result of purposive steering. An account of deliberative democracy as a political culture thus conceptualizes deliberative democracy as the overall prevalence of those norms, expectations, meanings, and customs (rather than first and foremost formal institutions, events, and actors) that result in the society being characterized by political discourse and engagement of a kind that meets the norms of deliberative democracy. For the sake of democratic legitimacy, this overarching political culture ought to characterize the polity as a whole; which is largely (even if not entirely) independent of the formal institutional framework of a society. Thus, whereas conceptualizing deliberative democracy primarily as a specific set of institutions invites institutional design and top-down steering, understanding its essence as hinging on a cultural development shifts the focus back onto creating the mere preconditions for an otherwise bottom-up and self-evolving process.
Above and beyond the basic formal rights, liberties, and guarantees, what, then, makes a political culture deliberative democratic? A political culture is deliberative democratic to the extent that it embodies, overall, the deliberative conditions of discursive reasoning, inclusiveness, equality, and fairness. To embody the substance of deliberative democracy, it must have a twofold nature: It must establish ‘ongoing critical scrutiny’ by treating authority as always open to challenge, yet it must at the same time use discursive and reciprocal means to bring critique to bear on the political process. Thus, a deliberative democratic political culture can be imagined as one with high levels of citizen-led critique and disruption of authoritative acts and discourses; but within a simultaneous culture of toleration, inclusiveness, and acceptance of the justificatory process (see Forst, 2001, p. 366).​[2]​ Citizens’ critical scrutiny in this broad sense influences political decision-making if decision-makers have to reckon with critical demands for justification as an effective hurdle towards making authoritative decisions. Such a political culture would be expressive of democratic legitimacy in the sense that authority—even by those who possess it—is never regarded as taken for granted, but always open to, and indeed expectant of, challenge. Moreover, it would be democratically inclusive not necessarily in the sense of an endless series of individual demands for justification, but through all citizens’ contributing to the overarching culture that establishes the decisive ethos of disruption and justification, whilst constraining the use of unfair, strategic, and non-general and non-reciprocal claims.
This account of deliberative democracy cannot be understood as one that could or should be ‘enacted’ or ‘institutionalized.’ Nevertheless, it is possible to approach it in practice by establishing the preconditions for a deliberative democratic culture, and by promoting engagement and critique. One precondition is at least a basic level of democracy and freedom guaranteed through individual and associative rights and liberties (Habermas, 1996, p. 368; Dryzek, 2000, p. 11), without which the political culture could not be genuinely critical, equal and inclusive; as well as formally and effectively equal rights and opportunities for participation, without which it could not be engaging in a democratic sense. Lastly, room for effective critique demands transparency of political decision-making, with far-reaching freedom of information rights as well as independent, wide-ranging media. Again, these conditions, especially in a de facto sense, are impossible simply to ‘enact.’ However, an account of deliberative democratic legitimacy can highlight them as crucial to conceptions of deliberative democracy in practice, and serve as a standard by which existing political practices can be judged and exposed as illegitimate (see Forst, 2012, p. 181; Dryzek, 1990, p. 37).
In addition, there are ways in which engagement and critique can be encouraged. An account of deliberative democracy as a political culture revives the central role of the informal public sphere prominent in the early theory (Dryzek, 2000, p. 162). A flourishing and independent informal public sphere is what constitutes a bottom-up political culture in the first place. The public sphere is fundamentally open, autonomous and diverse, and characterized by freedom to voice opinions rather than attempts at insisting on power positions or authority (Habermas, 1996, pp. 360, 367; Dryzek, 1990, pp. 37-8). A flourishing public sphere can be encouraged through education, through support for voluntary associations, community groups, and citizen initiatives and participatory projects, as well as through the provision of public spaces for meetings, festivals, and campaigns.
Conclusion
My aim in this paper has been to develop a conception of deliberative democracy in practice that realizes the standard of legitimacy that the theory of deliberative democracy establishes. I have described the standard of legitimacy in deliberative democracy as the realization in practice of an individual right to justification as a matter of respect of all individuals as equals. Deliberation can be understood as a critical practice through which demands for justification can be made, and any unjustified use of power exposed. However, previous experience with deliberation in the real world shows that it does not always or necessarily fulfill this role; in fact, it can also have the exact opposite effect of giving authorities an additional means to cement their power. This does not mean that all mini-publics are ill-intentioned or counterproductive. My aim has been to highlight their potential to detract from, rather than to enable, the realization of deliberative democratic legitimacy. If this mere potential is a concern for deliberative democracy, mini-publics cannot necessarily and in all cases be regarded as contributing to the instantiation of deliberation in practice, even if only as one component within a larger system.
Yet, the real problem for deliberative democratic theory in this regard are not the particular features of mini-publics. Rather, it is the general approach of seeking to innovate democracy by means of institutional design that is counterproductive from a legitimacy perspective. The decisive component of deliberative democracy, I have argued, is not some set of institutional specificities, but a certain political culture. Deliberative democracy can thus be conceived of as a political culture, implying that it cannot be artificially engineered, but can only self-evolve gradually and bottom-up.
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^1	  Note that, based on this definition of democratic legitimacy, legitimacy may not be the only norm democratic polities would or should be striving for. In particular, while the dimension of deliberative democracy I have outlined deems a certain degree of interrupting, indeed unsettling state authority to be imperative as a basic precondition for the (never fully achieved but temporarily acceptable degree of) legitimacy of this authority, this may simultaneously be undesirable from the perspective of ‘getting things done,’ that is, responding to urgent political issues and ensuring a ‘smooth’ running of politics. This poses the question what the right balance ought to be between the norm of legitimacy and other norms such as efficiency or effectiveness of governance; a question which is, however, beyond the scope of this particular article and argument. Here, it suffices to note that inasmuch as legitimacy ought to be established in democratic polities, it demands critical scrutiny of authority by those subject to it; and where this may be seen to disrupt policy-making in undesirable ways, this opens up the question of the right balance between legitimacy and other norms, rather than implying (based on this reason alone) a need to revise the definition of legitimacy.
^2	  Note that this ideal description refers to the overall cultural character of the polity; I am not here making an argument about whether specific instances of deliberation or justification ought to conform to the ideal type of not. Even if specific instances might take, for instance, activist (Young 2001), partisan (White and Ypi 2011), non-public (Chambers 2004), or interested (Mansbridge et al. 2010) forms, they might, as these authors have highlighted, still contribute positively to a deliberative culture overall. However, since my argument is precisely that what matters is the overall cultural character of a society as a whole, considering such questions relating to specific instances of deliberation is beyond the scope of this paper.
